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Civil Procedure
A Critique of Jurisdictionality
Scott Dodson1
Introduction
Since recognizing, in 1998, that “jurisdiction . . . is a word of
many, too many meanings,”2 the Supreme Court has engaged in a
deliberate effort to bring discipline to the process of characterizing
a rule as either jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional.3 That effort is
to be applauded. Because parties and courts are prone to
characterizing a rule as jurisdictional when they really mean
emphatic, important, or mandatory, the Court’s effort has brought
more attention and care to the use of the jurisdictional label by
courts and litigants. The Court’s effort also has useful principles
for resolving the characterization inquiry. Because questions of
jurisdictionality arise frequently and because late-discovered
jurisdictional transgressions waste significant judicial and litigant
resources, the Court’s effort appropriately seeks solutions for a
pervasive and harmful problem.4
The result of this effort has culminated in the articulation of a
tripartite framework for resolving jurisdictional characterizations,
which the Court set out authoritatively in 2017 in Hamer v.
Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago.5
First, because “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower
federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” nonstatutory rules
cannot be jurisdictional.6 Thus, limits contained only in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, or Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, among others, are always

1

Excerpted and adapted from Scott Dodson, A Critique of
Jurisdictionality, 39 REV. LITIG. 355 (2020).
2
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).
3
Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619, 620–21
(2017).
4
Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2008).
5
138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017).
6
Id. at 17.
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nonjurisdictional.7 Analogously, because only Congress may
define the jurisdiction of Article I agencies, adjudicatory rules set
internally by agencies must also be nonjurisdictional.8
Second, a statutory deadline governing case transfer between
Article III courts is jurisdictional.9 This category seems quite
small; to date, only statutory deadlines governing civil appeals and
(perhaps) civil petitions for certiorari characterized as
jurisdictional.10 By definition, this category excludes both transfer
deadlines that are nonstatutory11 and statutory deadlines that do
not involve the transfer of the case between Article III courts.12
Third, all other statutory limits are jurisdictional only if
Congress clearly so states.13 In adopting the clear-statement rule
for this category, the Court has insisted that Congress need not
“incant magic words.”14 Rather, “traditional tools of statutory
construction,” including text, context, and precedent, “must
plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with
jurisdictional consequences.”15 This clear-statement rule has
proven fatal to all proffered jurisdictional characterizations.16

7

Id. at 20.
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 71 (2009).
9
Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 18.
10
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S.
33, 45 (1990).
11
E.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 64 (1970) (holding the
rule-based deadline for filing a criminal petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court to be nonjurisdictional).
12
E.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (holding
nonjurisdictional the statutory 120-day deadline for a losing veteran to
file a notice of appeal with the Article I Veterans Court).
13
Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20 n.9; see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006).
14
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013).
15
United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1631–33 (2015).
16
In one case, the Court held the Tucker Act’s filing deadline to be a
“more absolute” bar that requires sua sponte policing by the courts but
very carefully avoided an express characterization of the deadline as
jurisdictional. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S.
130, 134, 139 (2008). Bowles held a statutory appellate deadline to be
jurisdictional but primarily based on precedent, Bowles, 551 U.S. at 206,
and Hamer subsequently classified Bowles as falling under the second
factor of the framework, Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 18.
8
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The Court has declared this tripartite framework “readily
administrable”17 and “clear and easy to apply,”18 virtues it
regularly strives to achieve in jurisdictional doctrine. Yet a set of
new complications and oddities has arisen. These infirmities
suggest that the Court’s framework is not—and may never be—
as clear, easy, or administrable as the Court has professed. In this
Chapter, I expose the weaknesses of the present framework and
offer some perspectives for reforming that doctrine in ways that
return to the good progress the Court has made.
The Critique
The first factor—that only statutes can be jurisdictional—is
actually false because court rules can be jurisdictional. Take, for
example, the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Court
has promulgated rules to govern such proceedings, and those rules
could potentially be jurisdictional notwithstanding their
nonstatutory basis.19
Even lower-court rules could be jurisdictional if Congress
delegates the power to make jurisdictional rules to the Supreme
Court. Congress already has done so in several instances,
including by authorizing court-created rules “defin[ing] when a
ruling of a district court is final for purposes of appeal”20 and
“provid[ing] for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the
courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for [by statute].”21
The Supreme Court has accepted those delegations and
promulgated rules under them,22 rules that themselves could be
jurisdictional despite the lack of any parallel statutory language.
Rule 23(f), promulgated pursuant to that delegation, is a good
17

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513–16.
Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20.
19
Supreme Court Rule 17, for example, states that the “initial pleading
shall be preceded by a motion for leave to file,” SUP. CT. R. 17(3), and it
is at least arguable that the failure to file such a motion could be deemed
a jurisdictional defect to any subsequent pleading.
20
28 U.S.C. § 2072(c).
21
Id. § 1292(e).
22
See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4) (prescribing the tolling effect of postjudgment motions); id. 5(a) (providing for interlocutory appeals); FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(f) (providing for interlocutory appeal of a classcertification decision).
18
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example of a nonstatutory rule that could be characterized as
jurisdictional because it sets the parameters by which a case
moves from the authority of a district court to the authority of a
circuit court. It’s hard to imagine anything that would be more
jurisdictional.
Nevertheless, in Nutraceutical v. Lambert, the Supreme Court
characterized Rule 23(f) as nonjurisdictional under the first
Hamer factor, saying perfunctorily, “because Rule 23(f)’s time
limitation is found in a procedural rule, not a statute, it is properly
classified as a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.”23 Whether
Rule 23(f) is jurisdictional is debatable. But it cannot be
nonjurisdictional simply because it is nonstatutory. Rule 23(f) is
the product of a delegation from Congress to the Court of
jurisdiction-setting authority. Nutraceutical’s reliance on the first
Hamer factor was therefore misplaced.
The second factor in the Hamer framework—that statutory
time prescriptions for the transfer of a case from one Article III
court to another are always jurisdictional—causes some oddities.
Venue transfer, for example, is a statutory mechanism of
transferring adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to
another. The general venue-transfer statutes do not have specified
time prescriptions in them, but Congress certainly could so
provide. And the MDL venue-transfer provision does have a time
prescription: “Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to
the district from which it was transferred . . . .”24 The second
Hamer factor thus seems to make this time prescription for MDL
venue transfer jurisdictional, such that the MDL transferee court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain a transferred case after the
conclusion of pretrial proceedings.25
Yet a jurisdictional characterization for a venue rule is more
than a little awkward, for venue has long been deemed

23

139 S. Ct. 710, 713 (2019).
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
25
Other specialized venue-transfer statutes have similar timing
provisions. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (allowing inter-district transfer of
a criminal tax case if the defendant files a motion “within twenty days
after arraignment”).
24
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nonjurisdictional by the Court,26 and the civil venue statute
expressly disavows that it is jurisdictional.27 Further, the Supreme
Court has suggested that while the MDL-transfer time prescription
might be waivable by the parties and thus not jurisdictional,28 a
conclusion that major treatises and a majority of lower courts
support.29 How surprised MDL practitioners and courts must be to
find that Hamer invalidates such waivers because the MDLtransfer time prescription is jurisdictional!
The third Hamer factor—the clear-statement rule against
jurisdiction—suffers from the most complexity. That is peculiar
because a clear-statement rule is supposed to make things easy: if
the provision does not “speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in
any way to the jurisdiction of the court,”30 the provision should be
nonjurisdictional, end of inquiry. But the Court has been fainthearted about rigid adherence to the clear-statement rule. Instead,
the Court has declared repeatedly that Congress need not “incant
magic words.”31 Rather, “traditional tools of statutory
construction,” including text, context, and precedent, “must
plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with
jurisdictional consequences.”32
The result is clearly not a clear-statement rule, at least not one
that has recognizable analogues in other areas. Clear-statement
rules typically do not require consideration of the messiness of
precedent or statutory purpose. After all, the very purpose of
having a clear-statement rule in the first place is to avoid the
messiness of ordinary statutory interpretation. Yet the Court has,
under the third factor’s “clear-statement rule,” engaged in
substantial interrogations of context, precedent, and statutory
purpose.33
26

Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipping Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167–68
(1939).
27
28 U.S.C. § 1390(a); id. § 1406(b).
28
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26,
35, 36 n.1 (1998).
29
E.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.132 (4th ed. 2002).
30
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982).
31
Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 21 n.9
(2017).
32
United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1631–33 (2015).
33
E.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440–41 (2011); Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 168 (2010).
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In United States v. Wong, for example, the Court considered
whether the Federal Tort Claims Act provision stating that an
untimely action shall be “forever barred” is jurisdictional. The
five-justice majority characterized the language to not speak in
jurisdictional terms or address the power of the courts.34 The fourjustice dissent, reading the same language, disagreed,
characterizing the language as “absolute” and with “no
exceptions.”35 To the justices, the clear-statement rule appeared to
point in opposite directions.
The Court split again on a third-factor case in Patchak v.
Zinke,36 which called for the interpretation of a statute stating that
a certain kind of action “shall not be filed or maintained in a
Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.”37 A plurality of
four justices would have held the statute jurisdictional because it
“uses jurisdictional language” by directing that an action shall not
be filed or maintained but shall be dismissed.38 According to the
plurality, the statute “completely prohibits actions” and thus “is
best read as a jurisdiction-stripping statute.”39 Two justices
concurred without reaching the jurisdictionality issue, but the
three dissenting justices disagreed that the statute was
jurisdictional. In their eyes, the statute “does not clearly state that
it imposes a jurisdictional restriction.”40 Again, the clearstatement rule was of little use.
If each Hamer factor on its own generates uncertainty and
confusion, then consider the anomalies created by the interplay of
the factors.
One anomaly concerns criminal and civil appellate deadlines.
The time to file a notice of appeal is prescribed by statute for civil
cases but only by rule for certain criminal cases.41 As a result, the
statutory civil deadline is jurisdictional, but the nonstatutory
34

Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633.
Id. at 1640 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The FTCA’s filing deadlines are
jurisdictional.”).
36
138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
37
Id. at 904 (Thomas, J.).
38
Id. at 905 (Thomas, J.).
39
Id. at 906 (Thomas, J.).
40
Id. at 918–19 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
41
28 U.S.C. § 2107 (civil); FED. R. APP. P. 4 (criminal). A statutory
deadline applies to appeals of certain criminal matters by the United
States government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
35

Vol. 5

The Judges’ Book

27

criminal deadline cannot be. The same anomaly inheres in the
deadline to file a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court:
the civil deadline is jurisdictional because it is in a statute, yet the
criminal deadline is nonjurisdictional because it is set out only in
a court rule.42 It is difficult to fathom a compelling reason—and
the Court has not attempted to offer one—why the civil versions
of the certiorari deadlines should be typed jurisdictional, and the
criminal versions should not.
Deeper anomalies lurk. The statutory civil certiorari deadline
applies regardless of whether the reviewed court is a federal court
or a state court.43 When certiorari is from a federal, Article III
court, then the second factor of the framework makes that
statutory deadline automatically jurisdictional. But when
certiorari is from a state court or an Article I court, then that same
statutory deadline falls outside of the second factor and instead
must be evaluated according to the third factor’s presumption
against jurisdictionality. The Court’s framework thus subjects the
same statutory provision to varying jurisdictional analyses
depending upon the circumstances, perhaps resulting in the
peculiar conclusion that the civil certiorari deadline is
jurisdictional for some petitions but nonjurisdictional for others.44
The same peculiarity inheres in the statutory conditions for U.S.
Courts of Appeals to hear bankruptcy appeals directly from either
U.S. District Courts or Article I bankruptcy courts.45
The Solutions
These complications, oddities, and anomalies of the Hamer
factors undermine the Court’s attestation of a clear and simple
jurisdictional framework. Two modest fixes and one strategic ploy
could dramatically improve it going forward.
42

28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (civil); SUP. CT. R. 13.1 (criminal).
28 U.S.C. § 2101(c).
44
If the Court were to modify its framework to include in the second
factor transfers between state and federal courts, then it will run up
against the removal statute, which includes many timing prescriptions
that the lower federal courts have roundly declared nonjurisdictional. See
Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
55, 65–70 (2008).
45
28 U.S.C. § 158.
43
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The first fix would change the first factor to exempt
nonstatutory rules from the jurisdictional characterization unless
Congress either lacks the jurisdictional-control authority in the
first place or has lawfully delegated that authority to the
rulemaker. This change would recognize the fact that some
nonstatutory rules might be jurisdictional, such as the Supreme
Court’s own rules or rules promulgated under jurisdictiondelegating statutes.
The second fix would eliminate the second factor and change
the third factor to follow a more traditionally rigid clear-statement
approach. This change would preserve the nonjurisdictional status
of venue statutes and would simplify the application of the clearstatement rule going forward.
The strategic ploy is to avoid, whenever possible in hard
cases, the jurisdictional question altogether. Avoidance is
possible—perhaps even preferable—if dismissal is appropriate on
other nonmerits grounds.46 Avoidance is also possible if the rule
must be enforced whether or not jurisdictional. In other words, if
the real question in the case is whether the rule at issue is subject
to equitable exceptions or to party waiver, then the court can
answer that question directly in the negative without needing to
reach the jurisdictional question. Looking to other grounds to
resolve the case—such as nonmerits grounds or the particular
effects of the rule—can enable courts to avoid hard questions of
jurisdictional characterization left unsolved by the Hamer
framework.47
Conclusion
The Court’s jurisdictionality doctrine is showing signs of
wear. My primary aim has been to call attention to its fissures and
instabilities so that they can be corrected—through rebuilding or
repair—before they cause collapse. Perhaps the Court will take up
this challenge.

46

Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay Int’l Shipping Co., 549 U.S. 422, 431
(2007).
47
The Court has taken this approach on occasion. E.g., Manrique v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266, 1271–72 (2017).

